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When the Bush administration formulated it's new national
security strategy in mid-1990, it made certain assumptions about
the security and military threat posed by the then-Soviet Union.
Generally that threat was described as having receded to a level
where the U.S. would have up to two-years of warning prior to a
major European-centered global war. With the demise of the
former "evil empire," the Bush administration and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff re-evaluated the threat from the defunct USSR and
made new assumptions about the security and military threat posed
by the Russian and other former Soviet republics. In May 1992,
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote that the
U.S. could now count on eight to ten-years strategic warning
before a resurgent/emergent global threat arose.
Students and faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
recently returned from a twenty-one day educational exchange
visit to Russia and the Ukraine. The group, led by the author,
from the School's Department of National Security Affairs, in-
cluded four Navy, three Air Force, and one Army officer students
who are specializing in Russian area studies. Funding was pro-
vided by the individual services under the Defense Advanced
Language and Area Studies (DALASP) and the Quality of Analysis
(QofA) Programs.
The July 1992 trip to Russia and the Ukraine was made to
help the researchers determine what is the current state of the
former Soviet Union and specifically the state of the various
republic military forces? What the researchers hoped to deter-
mine is if the Bush administration's planning assumptions are
still valid? The answer to that question is the subject for
subsequent additional research and analysis, the full results of
which will not be available until 1993.
The researchers will either conclude that America's assump-
tions about the former Soviet Union are no longer valid and the
U.S. and NATO need to modify defense programs, or, that the
planned demobilization of the West's armed forces that were once
poised against the USSR can, and should, take place. Such analy-
sis obviously addresses the sources of future international
stability and instability and the prospective U.S. foreign policy
and defense role - both subjects for active consideration by many
of us.
1. The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Navy.
The trip offered a unique opportunity to study the evolving
former Soviet republics' military doctrines and military strate-
gies and the roles and missions that will be assigned to their
armed forces. The student and faculty researchers placed major
emphasis on observing the results of the changes in the military
caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent
emergence of independent republics. While in Russia and the
Ukraine, the group had the opportunity to interact with faculty
members, researchers, and military officers at the Military
History Institute, the Frunze Academy, the Institute of the
U.S.A. and Canada Studies, the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO), the Vasilevsky Air Defense
Academy, and other military-academic institutions.
The Russian military opened up certain geographic and func-
tional areas to the NPS students and faculty that heretofore had
been closed to Western visitors. Among the highlights were a
visit to the Khronstadt naval base (soon to become the headquar-
ters and location for the bulk of the Russian Baltic Fleet) the
armor museum at Kubinka, the aviation museum at Monino, and the
museum for artillery, engineering, and communications troops in
St. Petersburg. The NPS students and faculty attended special
seminars at these sites and had an audience with a Deputy Defense
Minister for the new republic of the Ukraine.
The comments below represent the raw results of some of the
research conducted on the trip. Documentation is not included
since no rules were established for attribution, or not, by each
individual interviewed. This will be clarified in writing before
any statements are directly attributed in public documents to
Russian or Ukrainian sources. The sources of the information
below range from a deputy minister of defense to serving general
officers to senior civilian academic researchers to civilian and
military instructors and professors. The sources worked at
various ministries, military academies, and institutes well known
to us in the West. Additional and detailed research results will
be published by NPS and should be available in early 1993.
Personalities and Current Political Issues
One of more intriguing questions that we had concerned a
series of Spring 1992 pro-Navy interviews with Andrey Afanasye-
vich Kokoshin, now Deputy Defense Minister for Russia, when he
was serving as the Deputy Director of the U.S.A. and Canada
Institute. The character of these articles was inconsistent
with the earlier positions taken on defense by Kokoshin. We were
told that these articles were an attempt to buy favor from the
Navy (since Kokoshin was openly being considered for the position
of Russian Defense Minister at the time) or the easy way out;
i.e. it would be easier establish a large navy on his initial
platform and if necessary to later say Russia could not afford or
did not need one than it would be to subsequently argue that
Russia needed a large ocean-going fleet.
We were also told that Kokoshin was supposed to get the job
as defense minister and that it was not clear why he did not.
Apparently the Russian military backed Kokoshin since they wanted
a civilian who could and would say "no" to Russian President
Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. We were told that the military did
not want the man who eventually was appointed Russian Defense
Minister, General-Colonel Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, because the
military was afraid that a serving officer would simply do what
he was told and not resist Yeltsin if necessary. When we asked
about the importance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed
Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) , Marshal
of Aviation Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, we were told that he
is not as important as he once was now that Russia has formed its
own armed forces.
The concept of the CIS as a political replacement for the
old USSR is not well understood by the Western media. No Russian
or Ukrainian ever referred to or used the term CIS during our
trip. What was used, is the name of the nation that we were in.
We observed a resurgence of strong national pride. We came away
with the conclusion that the military of the Ukrainian republic
is primarily loyal to Ukraine and not to Russia or the CIS. We
had received earlier suggestions from Russians that the Ukrainian
armed forces would actually be manned by Russians as the solution
for how the Russians were going to protect their southwestern
borders. That concept appears to be a Russian dream not shared
by anyone that we met in the Ukraine.
The Russians and Ukrainians appeared to have settled the
Black Sea Fleet by first deciding the type of political relation-
ship they wanted and letting that determine the importance of the
fleet controversy. The politicians did not let their military
leaders determine the outcome of this issue, which seemed to us
to be a very healthy sign.
After noting with a number of Russians the openness of the
current era and contrasted it with other historical periods of
similar disclosure, we asked when this current period would
close. The answer that we were most often given was "soon." Our
conclusion was that we should take full advantage of the current
opportunity to learn about the Russians and Ukrainians from
visits such as ours.
Russian Military Science
There has been an age-old debate over how Soviet military
science organized war. We attempted to learn how well the West
actually knew Soviet military science. Regarding war's technical
characteristics, the Russians acknowledged that local/global was
the first order of distinction; the choice of nuclear or conven-
tional weapons was a secondary or tertiary issue. We were also
told that the former Chief of the General Staff of the USSR,
Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Vasilyevich Ogarkov, spoke
out against relying on nuclear weapons as early as 1966 at the
Voroshilov General Staff Academy. This early date appears to be
not known in the West and we were promised a copy of the tran-
script of this very early lecture.
We were told that the strategic missions of the Soviet armed
forces found in the 1987 book The Navy and elsewhere are not new
and that they can be inferred from the published mid-1970s lec-
tures from the Voroshilov Academy. Upon our return, a compari-
son of the strategic missions contained in The Navy and those
found in the mid-1970s Voroshilov Academy lecture notes reveals
significant differences in emphasis and content. As we know, the
strategic missions contained in The Navy also differed signifi-
cantly from those published by Marshal Vasiley Danilovich Soko-
lovskiy in his book Military Strategy
.
Everyone that we talked
to agreed that the strategic missions of the Russian or Ukrainian
armed forces will be different than either of these once new
n
military doctrines and strategies are approved.
We also had a series of discussions about the similarity of
future ground warfare with naval warfare and were told that the
Russians were researching this subject. This appears to be one of
their lessons learned from the Persian Gulf war and parallels
research previously published in the West.
Russian Military History
The Russians defined military history as anything that
happened through yesterday; hence they felt more "comfortable" in
discussing the history of the Persian Gulf war, or the history of
the initial Yeltsin period, etc., rather than emerging doctrine
and strategy. Our discussions of history often were surrogates
for discussions of today's issues. The Soviet military reforms
of 1924-1925 were most often used for such purposes and we spent
a considerable period of time considering the applicability of
that period to today. The Russians made sure that we received
the message that they would not simply replicate the forces
developed or the military strategy during that era.
Most of the instructors at the Frunze Academy said that they
have no substantive knowledge of Czarist-era Russian military
history, especially during its final days. They are only now
being allowed to research this period and hope to use history to
replace the legitimacy for their regime that was once provided
for by ideology. We were told, however, that it is neither new
nor unusual for Russians to research the defensive or initial
period of the Second Great Patriotic War. The recent research
that we have seen published in their literature about the defen-
sive is not new research, but rather research that had been
performed previously. This research was not, however, available
to those outside of the "system" since it was previously classi-
fied secret.
We were told by the Russians that we should take advantage
of military historical research that they have done already so
that we would not need to perform it. Under "scientific" social-
ism, once a topic has been thoroughly and correctly researched,
it need not be done again by anyone again since only one answer
was possible. We were somewhat surprised that this view is still
alive and well in newly "democratic" Russia.
The Western Theater of War
We had numerous discussions about the Western reports of old
Soviet/Warsaw Pact nuclear war plans for the western theater of
military operations (WTVD) . These plans were recently published
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
their journal Survival . Most Russians were aware of the publi-
cation. This subject was perhaps the most sensitive of all that
we addressed with the Russians. At least one individual acknowl-
edged the existence and authenticity of these plans and stated
that nuclear operations were indeed to begin early in any war
with the West but they would have been limited to the WTVD. We
asked numerous individuals if the leaks were authoritative and
were told yes and that plans were being changed.
These plans did not correspond to themes used in articles,
speeches, and books of Marshal Ogarkov during the 1980s. It
seemed to us in the West that Ogarkov had not advocated nuclear
strikes during strategic operations in the WTVD and we had taken
his writings as evidence that Soviet military strategy and opera-
tional art had changed to deemphasize nuclear war fighting. We
were told that Marshal Ogarkov did not speak for the military
when he wrote those articles and monographs and that we should
have never interpreted those as anything more than his personal
views. If this is true, then much recent content analysis of
Soviet military literature may be fatally flawed.
Others in our group, not from NPS, were more interested in
proposed operations in the Northwestern TVD (NWTVD) and asked
similar direct questions. They were told that Soviet war plans
did not call for an invasion of Finmark under normal circumstanc-
es, but that there were contingency plans to go through Sweden
and occupy northern Norway as far south as Tromso. Such opera-
tions were not, however, to be central to the overall war effort.
We were asked how it would be interpreted in the West if a
variant three defensive military doctrine (Battle of Khalkhin Gol
surrogate) would be replaced by variant two (Battle of Kursk
surrogate) . The Russians hinted that they were headed in that
direction but that the offensive counterattack might take place
primarily with air power (but not only with those forces) . The
Russians said that such a change should not bother us with buffer
states now between Russia and Germany.
Russian Military Education System
We confirmed that the business of the Frunze and Vasilevsky
Academies is operational art and tactics. We were told that
there are no Air Force or Navy officers (students or faculty) at
these academies. This somewhat surprised us since many in the
West assumed the Soviet educational system for the command and
general staff-level was similar to our own. Frunze students study
very little outside of their own ground forces; for example, the
Normandy invasion is studied at the Frunze Academy only as a
defensive operation and not in the context of projecting power
from the sea.
Each military service has its own schools for command and
general staff. "Combined arms," at the operational-level of war-
fare as taught at the Frunze Academy, is restricted to integra-
tion of all branches of the Ground Forces. The first time the
Soviet/Russian military gets together for multi-service, or
"joint," education is at General Staff Academy. This means that
the Western perception by many that "combined arms" operations
(at the operational-level of warfare) was a Soviet strength was
incorrect.
We asked about the impact on the curricula of academies of
the demise of an ideological role for the armed forces. We were
told that they had already revised their curricula but did not
add any new materials. Apparently they allowed for additional
in-depth coverage of what was already specified instead. We were
also told that the Frunze Academy previously spent 90% of their
time teaching nuclear or nuclear-related aspects of war and armed
conflict but that this is now down to around 10%.
We concluded from discussions of correlation of forces and
how to construct equivalent division and effective equivalent
divisions that our methods were very similar. The Russians made
great pains to use Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-
approved numbers. We also had a discussion about net assessment
as a methodology. We discussed the use of the IISS Military
Balance numbers rather than "real" numbers for education and
training. Most Russians seemed familiar with this document and
said that they used it for basic classroom exercises. None used
it for homework since, as we were told, Russian military officers
are not assigned any homework nor at-home readings while attend-
ing academies.
How do the Russians Learn About us?
A discussion which we had with virtually every instructor
with whom we talked involved how did the Soviets and how do the
Russians develop specialists about other nations? We were told
that this is strictly the role of intelligence services and that
there is no counterpart to Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) or sub-
specialists as found in the U.S. armed forces. At the Frunze
Academy instructors are merely given materials about the U.S. to
use in the classroom and are not expected to deviate from that
material. We discussed a wide variety of alternative plans and
sources of information.
We asked most Russians and Ukrainians if they were familiar
with the KGB's Operation RYAN, as reported by former KGB General
Oleg Gordievsky
.
12 All said yes and that Operation RYAN was
real. This topic was used in many additional discussions as an
example of how bad the KGB understood us and how dangerous it was
to place all their emphasis on learning about the U.S. on a
system that could have produced RYAN.
The Russians and Ukrainians seemed to not understand that in
the U.S., there might be officially published service positions
on the lessons of the Persian Gulf war that might differ with
views published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although we can see this in their own
writing, it seems to be a failure in understanding how to do
proper content analysis of U.S. literature evidence. They also
seemed to have great difficulty in understanding us since we did
not use standardized terms in our politico-military literature.
When Westerners use Soviet or Russian terms, J they took this as
evidence that we had finally adopted the "correct" (Russian)
terms.
After reviewing comments on some of our own research and the
lack of depth of sources from their own country, most of us
concluded that although we are in America, we often have access
to some better Russian sources than they do. Duplication and
compartmentalization of efforts within Russia have resulted in a
lack of awareness of what internal resources are already avail-
able. The definition of initiative does not appear to include
researching any areas that have not been "assigned."
Nuclear and Other Issues
We were told that Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) already had a permissive action link (PAL)
system to prevent inadvertent launch. PAL authorization would
have to be received in data form in order to be useful, i.e. an
alternative scenario of telephone authorization would not be
sufficient to "unlock" the systems. We were also told that the
Russians would move more of their nuclear weapons out to sea
on board SSBNs and might be willing to give up the other two legs
of the triad.
We also discussed Soviet nuclear targeting and Russian
President Yeltsin's statement that Russian missiles were no
longer targeting American (and other) cities. This "shift" did
not reguire actual changes since, we were told, cities were not
targeted by design, only as an unfortunate consequence. Hence
when some in Russia said that nothing has changed as a result of
Yeltsin's actions, they are right.
We were told that the Soviets had "fooled us" over the Tu-22
BACKFIRE bomber and that it obviously was an intercontinental
weapons system. We were told that they could retrofit the refuel-
ing probe within hours. We were also told that since superpower
nuclear weapons issues are now essentially settled, the numbers
of warheads were going down substantially, and no one was arguing
internally over the role of nuclear weapons, the Strategic Rocket
Forces would be ranked lower in the overall precedence of mili-
tary services.
Regarding a new revolution in military affairs, we were told
that although a new revolution was regarded as theoretically
possible (due to advances in technology) , it would not happen due
to the realities of the economy. There would be no opportunities
for serial development of many new weapons and the Russians will
shift to a prototyping system to keep up with the West.
We were told that the Russian fleet would be limited to the
Barents and Northern Norwegian Seas, the Bering Sea and Sea of
Okhotsk, and the Northern Sea of Japan and specifically that it
would not deploy along the U.S. sea lines of communications.
What Were They Interested in From Us?
Russians questions of us involved six main areas: American
politics and politico-military doctrine and strategy; nuclear
issues; naval forces; NATO and Europe; war gaming; and about
themselves.
In the first area, the Russians were interested in: the
probable results of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections; how
would we implement our new military doctrine and strategy; how
could the new military doctrine and strategy actually have been
developed in a top-down manner; the status of the Competitive
Strategies Initiative (CSI); the difficulty of conversion and
reconversion of industry; what were America's unilateral capabil-
ities to wage a strategic-level war and operational-level cam-
paign; and the lessons of the Persian Gulf war?
In the nuclear area, the Russians asked us: if the recent
agreements on nuclear arms between Presidents George Bush and
Yeltsin would require a revision of our new national military
doctrine and strategy; if lower numbers of strategic nuclear
warheads might suggest a shift to countervalue and non-prompt
nuclear targeting; how long it would take from receipt of warning
until our nuclear forces could respond; how the American military
viewed the deep reductions in nuclear forces; if the U.S. mili-
tary thought they would reprogram nuclear resources into conven-
tional forces; and what was the future of the strategic defense
initiative (SDI) and the global protection against limited
strikes (GPALS) program?
Regarding naval forces, the Russians asked: if any of the
documents concerning the new U.S. military doctrine and strategy
addressed sea communications and if we assumed any opposition at
sea; if we would now revise the AIRLAND battle doctrine and if
would it become an Air-Land-Sea doctrine; what was the future of
the U.S. Sixth Fleet; about naval arms control, specifically an
attempt to control naval arms through budget limitations; and why
the U.S., the British, and/or the French were still patrolling
off their coasts in the new international security environment
when they had ended all patrols off our coasts?
With regard to NATO and Europe, the Russians asked: what was
the impact on NATO of the creation of Western European Union
(WEU) armed forces; what was the number of U.S. troops and divi-
sions to be left in Europe under the current plan and our best
guess for the post-election period; whether the West ever had
serious plans to invade the Warsaw Treaty states; and why were we
upgrading the Pershing missiles? In discussions about military
capabilities versus intentions we were asked why each of us had
looked first at capabilities instead of intentions. They wanted
to know why we did not have plans to fight France or the United
Kingdom since these nations had capabilities to attack the U.S.?
The Russians also wanted to know how we do simulations and
war gaming; man/man or man/machine and if we had special teams to
play the enemy or computer models instead? We were told that
they now use green and dark blue to represent two opposing
sides. Regarding themselves, the Russians and Ukrainians asked
us about future cooperative security actions and how we thought
the Russian/Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet issue should be settled.
One thing that surprised us was what they did not want to
know. During questions and answers that followed a presentation
about our new national security strategy, the Ukrainians did not
want us to explain our planning scenarios, saying that they
already had studied those and understood them.
Conclusions
From the perspective of the participants of the trip and the
sponsors who funded it, the benefits appear to be well worth the
costs involved. Each student will take with him/her the experi-
ences from their three-week exposure to the Russians and Ukrai-
nians and use that experience during their military career. From
the perspective of a faculty member, it is clear that both NPS
instruction and research will benefit as well.
The participants of this research trip intend to prepare
additional technical reports as well as student theses based upon
their experiences while in Russia and the Ukraine. It is hoped
that the successes of this first endeavor will lead to repetition
while the current "window" of openness remains open and an expan-
sion of DALASP/QofA funded activities for students and faculty in
other areas of the world.
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